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1.   Introduction 
During the past two hundred years, there have been three major transplantations of legal codes. 
First, during the period of imperialism (1890-1914) French law was transplanted throughout Europe and 
western law (especially French and English law) was exported throughout Latin America, Asia and Africa. 
Second, post-World War II, many newly independent states once again borrowed legal code from major 
western powers. United States law played an increasingly important role, but countries also borrowed from 
those western countries from which they had originally received their law. Third, following the collapse of 
socialist system in the late 1980s, countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union 
rebuilt their legal systems drawing heavily on the European and the United States models. While the massive 
importation of legal code allows countries to quickly overhaul their statutory law in comparison to the time 
it took for these laws to evolve in the exporting countries, available evidence from formerly socialist 
countries suggests that the enforcement of transplanted law is often problematic. Weak legal institutions 
have been singled out as a key impediment to future growth and development in these countries (Black, 
Kraakman, and Tarassova 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer 1997; Stiglitz 1999). Many of the 
countries in the Former Soviet Union that have adopted sophisticated laws to protect creditors and 
shareholders lack effective legal institutions to enforce these laws and are plagued by corruption (Pistor, 
Raiser, and Gelfer 2000). While Russia has imported the most sophisticated corporate law in the entire 
region, Russian shareholder rights are systematically violated and cross-country surveys suggest that the 
Russian judiciary is ineffective and its legal and administrative institutions are not trustworthy (Black et al 
2000).  
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (La Porta et al. 1997; La Porta et al. 1998) 
(hereinafter LLSV) argue that the correct legal code is critical for efficient financial markets, which are in 
turn critical for economic development. Using a sample of forty-nine non-socialist countries, LLSV show 
that countries belonging to different legal families (English common law, and French, German and 
Scandinavian civil law) exhibit different quality of shareholder and creditor protections in their statutory 
laws. Common law family countries have the most investor-friendly law; French and German civil law 
countries have the least investor-friendly law, and Scandinavian family countries fall somewhere in between. 
LLSV also examine the impact of legal families on enforcement. They find that German and Scandinavian 
civil law countries dominate English common law countries, which, in turn, perform better than French civil 
law countries. A reason for this result is that enforcement is highly correlated with GNP per capita, and the 
German and Scandinavian civil law countries are among the richest countries in their sample. However, after 
controlling for GNP per capita, LLSV conclude that countries with investor-friendlier laws also tend to have 
the most effective enforcement of law: French civil law countries have poorer enforcement than common 
law countries; German civil law countries tend to have poorer enforcement than common law countries, and 
enforcement in Scandinavian is similar to common law countries. A policy implication that has been drawn 
from the LLSV analysis is that transplanting the correct legal code (i.e. the common law) will enhance 
economic development (e.g., see Levine 1999). 
In light of the importance of enforcement and effective legal institutions (hereinafter, denoted 
legality) for economic development in general and for post-socialist economies in particular, this paper seeks 
to identify determinants of legality. It develops and tests the proposition that the way in which the modern  2
formal legal order that evolved in some western countries was transplanted into other countries is a more 
important determinant than the supply of a particular legal code. Our argument is based on two key notions. 
First, for the law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have 
an incentive to use the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and develop the law. Second, the 
judges, lawyers, and other legal intermediaries that are responsible for developing the law must be able to 
increase the quality of law in a way that is responsive to demand for legality.  
In order to test our theory, we develop proxies for the transplanting process and the supply of 
particular legal codes. Regarding supply, we use the legal families since LLSV demonstrate that there is a 
significant difference in quality of laws between the families at least with respect to the protection of 
investors. Furthermore, legal scholars show that these families differ significantly in style (Zweigert and 
Kötz 1998). Regarding the transplanting process, we classify countries into those that developed their 
formal legal order internally (origins) and those that received their formal legal order externally (transplants) 
during the period when they first developed or received a comprehensive formal legal order. For most 
countries, the relevant period is the nineteenth century; for some it reaches into the first half of the twentieth 
century. Our basic argument is that for legal institutions to be effective, a demand for law must exist so that 
the law on the books will actually be used in practice and legal intermediaries responsible for developing the 
law are responsive to this demand. If the transplant adapted the law to local conditions, or had a population 
that was already familiar with basic legal principles of the transplanted law, then we would expect that the 
law would be used. However, if the law was not adapted to local conditions, or if it was imposed via 
colonization and the population within the transplant was not familiar with the law, then we would expect 
that initial demand for using these laws to be weak. Countries that receive the law in this fashion are thus 
subject to the ”transplant effect”: their legal order would function less effectively than origins or transplants 
that either adapted the law to local conditions and/or had a population that was familiar with the transplanted 
law. 
Our econometric analysis shows that the "transplant effect" is a more important predictor of legality 
than the supply of a particular legal family. We also show that the transplant effect has a substantial negative 
impact on economic development via its impact on legality, but has no direct effect. By contrast, the impact 
of transplanting a particular legal family on economic development is not robust to different legality 
measures. Moreover, the overall impact of the transplanting process is stronger than the impact of a 
transplanting a particular legal family.  
  This paper contributes to an emerging literature that attempts to explain the variance of institutional 
development across countries. Most of this literature focuses on the political economy of institution 
building. There is a growing literature on just why strong institutions emerge or fail to emerge in formerly 
socialist economies that are making a transition to a market economy (Berkowitz and Li 2000; Roland and 
Verdier 1999; Zhuravskaya 2000). There is also a growing interest in tracing the determinants of differences 
among legal families (Glaeser and Shleifer 2000). Among the studies that explore determinants of high 
quality institutions, this paper is closest in spirit to Rodrik (2000), who provides empirical support for his 
argument that a well-designed strategy for institution building should take into account local knowledge, and 
should not over-emphasize best practice blueprints used in developed countries at the expense of local 
participation and experimentation.  Our work also relates to Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000), who  3
use mortality rates of the first European settlers as an instrument for current institutions in the countries that 
they colonized. They argue that the settlers’ initial supply of institutions impacted the long run effectiveness 
of institutions. Contrary to their approach, we focus on the compatibility of imported institutions with initial 
local demand, and analyze its implication for long-term institutional development. 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we develop our argument that the 
way in which the law is transplanted is a critical determinant of legality, and code the same forty-nine 
countries that LLSV used in their study accordingly. In section three, we test for the impact of the 
transplantation process and legal families on legality and economic development. Section four checks for the 
robustness of these results to variations in the country coding; section five checks for the validity of our 
aggregate legality measure; section six concludes. 
 
2.   The Transplant Effect 
  Virtually all countries today have a set of rules embodied in codes or court cases that were 
established by designated state organs, and state institutions in charge of enforcing these rules. We call this 
set of rules the formal legal order. Although quite important in many countries today, the formal legal order 
is but one element of the governance structure of society. Informal norms and institutions govern all 
societies, including the most developed ones. This informal legal order evolves over time mostly by 
internalizing existing norms of a social group (Coleman 1990; Sunstein 1996). It is enforced not by the 
state, but relies largely upon trust and reputation effects as well as monitoring devices. As we will discuss 
below, the transplantation of formal legal systems that have evolved in several European countries in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has shaped formal legal orders in most countries.   
In this section we characterize the transplanting process. We propose that countries that have 
developed formal legal orders internally, adapted the transplanted law to local conditions, and/or had a 
population that was already familiar with basic legal principles of the transplanted law should be able to 
further develop the formal legal codes and build effective legal systems. By contrast, countries that received 
foreign legal systems without similar pre-dispositions are much more constrained in their ability to develop 
the formal legal order and will have greater difficulties in developing effective legal systems (the transplant 
effect). In order to test these propositions empirically, we divide our forty-nine countries into ten that 
developed their formal legal order internally (origins) and thirty-nine that received their formal legal order 
externally (transplants); we then divide the transplants into those that are and those that are not subject to the 
transplant effect.  
 
2.1   Origins vs. Transplants 
Most countries derived their current formal legal order from Europe during the nineteenth century 
and the early twentieth century. Earlier legal transplants are well known, including the reception of Roman 
law in Europe, the enactment of the Chinese codes in other parts of Asia, or the transfer of Spanish and 
Portuguese law to Latin America. Indeed, as Watson (1974) argues, legal transplants are as old as the law is. 
The transplanting process that occurred in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries superseded all earlier 
transplants. Moreover, despite lively borrowing and transplantation since then, most countries have retained 
the core characteristics of the legal system they received during this period. The wholesale transplantation of  4
legal systems was made possible by the consolidation and formalization of legal systems in Europe that 
coincided with the development of the nation state. The expansion of European influence through war and 
conquest was primarily responsible for the transplantation of these laws to countries in Asia, Africa, North 
America and Latin America, although some of these non-European countries transplanted these laws 
voluntarily.  
Three legal families, the English common law, the French civil law and the German civil law, 
dominated the process of consolidation and formalization of formal legal orders in Europe. The English 
common law has evolved over centuries and, in contrast to the French and German civil families, was never 
systematized and codified. Case law, or precedents established by courts, define legal principles that are 
applied to other cases. The roots of the common law date back to the Norman conquest of England in 1066, 
but only in the late fifteenth centuries was a firm body of legal principles established that replaced 
preexisting customary law. The publication of law since the sixteenth century (Ross 1998) and the 
development of legal reports, which was completed in the second half of the nineteenth century contributed 
to the formation of a consistent body of law that was widely accessible. Statutory law gained in importance 
since the mid-nineteenth century, but case law remains the hallmark of the English legal system to this day.  
In continental Europe, statutory law has dominated case law. The Napoleonic codes enacted 
between 1804 and 1811 have had the greatest impact on the codification movement in Europe. These codes 
consolidated existing legislation and case law. The commercial code in particular codified existing business 
practice in language that was systematic and accessible to lay people (Zweigert and Kötz 1998). Politically, 
the codification movement manifested the superiority of the parliament over the executive and the judiciary 
in making new law. The other major codification of the nineteenth century is the German civil code enacted 
in 1900, which was preceded by commercial, criminal, civil and criminal procedure codes, as well as a 
bankruptcy law. Codification in Germany was delayed until the end of the nineteenth century primarily for 
political reasons. The German codes differ from the earlier French codification. For the German civil code in 
particular, legal scholars compiled a consistent system of civil law based on Roman legal principles, and, as 
such, wrote codes that were highly technical and thus much less accessible to lay people.  
Most legal families operating currently are derived either from the English common law, the French 
civil law or the German civil law. We denote England, France and Germany as origin countries, or simply 
origins, because their formal legal orders developed largely internally and display highly idiosyncratic 
features, some legal borrowing notwithstanding. Comparative legal scholarship also distinguishes a fourth 
legal family, the Scandinavian one. The Scandinavian legal family is not built around a major codification, 
like the French or the German legal family, nor does it have a body of case law like the English common 
law. Early codification of existing business practices and the close political and economic relations among 
the four Scandinavian countries have given rise to a legal family based on statutory law, that is distinct from 
the legal systems described above. Although Finland was part of Sweden from the twelfth century until 
Sweden ceded Finland to Russia in 1908, and Norway was part of Denmark until 1814, we treat all four 
countries as origins (Knapp 1972). Denmark, Norway and Sweden closely collaborated since the mid 19
th 
century in developing the formal modern law that has shaped their development since. While Finland was 
controlled by Russia from 1808 through 1917, it remained attached to the Scandinavian legal tradition  5
throughout the nineteenth century and continued this tradition after it became independent. Nevertheless, as 
a robustness check, we consider a classification where only Sweden and Denmark are Scandinavian origins.
1  
Table 2a summarizes the finding by LLSV (1998) that the legal families capture differences in the 
quality of law on the books. Shareholder rights and creditor rights are cumulative indices developed by 
LLSV that measure the quality of the protection of shareholder and creditor rights by statutory law. English 
common law family countries have the best laws, French and German civil law countries have the least 
investor-friendly law, and Scandinavian family countries fall somewhere in between. In light of these results, 
we use legal families as an indicator of the quality of the law supplied by different legal families.   
  In our sample, the United States, Austria and Switzerland are also origins. While English common 
law influenced the legal system in the United States during the colonial period, legal development in the 
United States has sharply diverged from the English system after the colonial period (Horwitz 1977). 
Because calling the United States an origin is controversial, we also classify it as a transplant as a robustness 
check. According to standard classification, Austria and Switzerland belong to the German legal family. The 
codification that forms the basis of the Austrian civil law, the AGBGB, was adopted in 1811, over ninety 
years before the adoption of the German civil code. It influenced the development of the German code, 
rather than the other way around. The major Swiss codification (the law on obligations of 1881 and the civil 
code of 1907) followed the German codification. However, it did not incorporate Roman law to the same 
extent as the German codifications, and differs considerably in style and organization from the German code 
(Zweigert and Kötz 1998). Table 1 lists the ten origins in our sample and notes the time when these systems 
were formed. All other countries (or territories that were later organized as independent states) received 
their formal legal orders, either voluntarily or involuntarily, from these ten origin countries. We call these 
countries "transplants".  
In order to characterize the transplanting process, we note that a legal order existed in transplants at 
the time when the European law was transplanted and that many countries had formalized at least part of 
their legal systems. A legal order is a property of every society. Norms may be formalized, i.e. embodied in 
written rules, or they may be based on conventions, customs, and remain informal. Most societies today 
have both informal and formal legal systems. Many societies that received European law in the nineteenth 
century were familiar with a formal legal order. Legal texts had a long tradition in Hindu, Islamic and 
Chinese law. In content and style, these legal texts, however, differ substantially from the modern European 
codification. For example, Hooker (1978) shows that issues of morality are much closer interwoven with 
legal rules and ambiguity rather than specificity characterizes their wording. Other societies did not have a 
formal legal order that was embodied in codes or case law and enforced primarily by the state. They were 
governed by an informal legal order that was enforced by social sanctions, including reputation effects and 
mutual monitoring. The social norms and enforcement mechanisms used differed considerably from society 
to society. The preexisting legal order persisted after the transplanting process was complete. In part, this 
was the intended outcome. In some instances the transplanted European law applied only to the European 
population, while local people continued to be governed by local custom. This was true in particular for 
Dutch colonies (Hooker 1975). In other cases, criminal and administrative law was applied to local people, 
but in family, inheritance, but also commercial matters, local law prevailed. This was the practice in many 
                                                             
1 We thank an anonymous referee for making this point.  6
English colonies, although the jurisdiction of common law courts was often extended over time (Katz 1986; 
Knapp 1972). Even when transplanted law was not as clearly circumscribed, and therefore in principle 
applicable to all subjects in all areas of the law, the government organs did not always apply the transplanted 
formal legal order to the indigenous population.  
We do not have data on the effectiveness of the initial legal order and can only speculate at the 
ability of countries to develop an effective legal order internally, had they not received the legal order from 
the West. Our data, however, allow us to determine whether the transplantation of foreign law has helped or 
hindered these countries to develop levels of legality that are comparable with those of origins. Legal 
scholars have long observed that there is a gap between formal law on the books and law in action. While 
this gap exists in origins, we would expect to observe a larger gap between law on the books and law in 
action in transplants. The logic of this prediction follows from the idea that the law is primarily a "cognitive 
institution" (Means 1980). This is self-evident with respect to the informal legal order. Observance of this 
law requires knowledge of the customs and habits of a social group. The fact that formal legal orders have 
put the key elements of the legal order in writing tends to disguise the fact that the effectiveness of these 
rules also rests on knowledge and understanding of these rules and their underlying values by social actors. 
While most members of society will not, and in fact need not, be familiar with the specifics of individual 
rules and regulations, they are familiar with the basic concepts of the legal order. Moreover, they can rely on 
legal professionals as intermediaries, who have a better knowledge of the formal legal order. But even for 
professionals to apply a special rule, they must not only grasp the wording of that rule, but also the concept 
behind it, the value judgments on which its rests, and its position within the overall legal order. Even a 
seemingly clear law - do not steal! - raises a host of interpretative problems when applied to real world cases. 
What about taking from a common pool, or overgrazing? What about taking something with the intention of 
returning it later, or picking up an object that (apparently) has been abandoned by the owner? An identical 
rule like this one would be interpreted differently by those charged with applying it and their understanding 
of the underlying values on which this norm rests. This is true even within the same legal system. If this was 
not the case, countries such as the United States would not need state supreme courts and a federal supreme 
court with the task of ensuring the uniform interpretation and application of the law within their jurisdiction.  
When a transplant country applies a rule that it has transplanted from an origin, it is effectively 
applying a rule to its own local circumstances that was developed in a foreign socioeconomic order. Thus, 
we would expect that the interpretation of a legal rule will differ more within a transplant than an origin. 
Applying a simple rule that prohibits stealing in the context of communal property is a case in point. Other 
examples include the transplantation of limited liability companies to China in the early twentieth century. 
According to Kirby (1995), while many firms used the label ‘limited liability company’, they remained 
unincorporated family owned businesses. Even where the corporate form was used, outside finance was 
marginal, as kinship networks provided the most important financial resources (Hamilton and Feenstra 
1997). They also ensured that obligations would be honored.  
The context specificity law has important implications for legality in transplant countries. Where 
the meaning of specific legal rules or legal institutions is not apparent, they will either not be applied or 
applied in a way that may be inconsistent with the intention of the rule in the context in which it originated. 
This in turn has implications for the perception and trustworthiness of the institutions applying them, and  7
thus for the future demand for these institutions. However, if a transplant country adopts foreign law from 
origins in a way that is sensitive to its initial conditions, then the meaning of these rules becomes clearer, and 
it is also simpler to develop institutions such as the courts, procurators, anti-trust agencies, etc. that enforce 
these rules. We conjecture that there are two reasons for this. First, when the law is adapted to local needs, 
people will use it and will want to allocate resources for enforcing and developing the formal legal order. 
Second, legal intermediaries responsible for enforcing and developing the formal legal order can be more 
effective when they are working with a formal law which is broadly compatible with the preexisting order, or 
which has been adapted to match demand. 
 
2.2  Receptive and unreceptive transplants   
Legal transplantation has taken different forms in different countries. Some legal transplants were 
imposed during occupation; others were part of a voluntary reform process initiated by the law receiving 
country. Differences in the transplanting process may impact the receptivity of the transplants, where 
receptivity is defined as the country’s ability to give meaning to the imported law. Based on the theoretical 
considerations developed in the previous section we develop proxies for the receptivity of import countries 
to foreign law, namely whether they have adapted the foreign law to local conditions, or whether they 
exhibit familiarity with the imported legal order. 
  Our argument is that a transplant increases its own receptivity by making a significant adaptation 
of the foreign formal legal order to initial conditions, in particular to the preexisting formal and informal 
legal order. Changes in the transplanted rules or legal institutions indicate that the appropriateness of these 
rules has been considered and modifications were made to take into account domestic legal practice or other 
initial conditions. Means (1980), for example, reports that Colombia voluntarily, but almost blindly, 
transplanted the Spanish commercial code of 1829. The few changes that were introduced were made in 
ignorance of the possible implications of these rules for business practice. For example, a provision 
requiring state approval for the formation of a corporation, which at the time was still common throughout 
Europe (the UK eliminated the registration requirement only in 1844), was eliminated from the books. At 
the end of the century when the code was amended, this time using Chilean law as a model, state approval 
became mandatory, despite the fact that this rule had meanwhile been liberalized in most other countries. 
Materials on the legislative process provide no evidence of the reasons for these changes. However, the legal 
profession was underdeveloped in Colombia, and this suggests that the laws were chosen and adopted 
without even considering their contents.  
Adaptation does not necessarily require that the transplanted law is changed significantly. 
However, at the very least, an informed choice about alternative rules must have been made. One indicator 
of an informed choice is that a country conducts extensive comparative research before adopting a foreign 
legal system. A good example is Japan. The process of legal transplantation began with the reorganization of 
the court system in the 1870s. Elements of Western law were introduced through case law in a gradual and 
piecemeal fashion before the enactment of comprehensive codes. The earlier drafts of the civil and 
commercial codes were largely modeled on French law. The civil code that was finally adopted, however, 
used German law as the dominant model. This model was adapted to allow sufficient room for local custom. 
In the words of Wigmore, a Western observer of the legal reforms during the Meiji restoration, “…the  8
leading ideas of Code and custom (where comparison is possible) have the same content; that where latitude 
could be given, the new Code has allowed to local varieties of usage the freest play; and that where novelties 
or inflexible rules have been determined on, the conditions were such as to admit legislative discretion”. 
Wigmore concludes that “the Codes are not in conflict with existing custom” (quoted in Haley 1991, p. 71). 
Another indicator that a transplant is receptive to formal legal order is that it has familiarity with 
the legal system that it uses as a model for legal borrowing. Countries that share a common legal history will 
be familiar with the transplanted legal concepts and will therefore have little reason to make major 
adaptations or to choose a system that is less familiar to them. Common roots in the distant past are, 
however, not sufficient. Most of the European countries can trace their legal history back to the Roman 
Empire. Yet, quite distinct legal systems developed on the basis of the Roman law, which incorporated 
centuries of legal practice that combined elements of Roman law with customary rules. Not all countries in 
Europe shared this experience in the same way. Spain, for example, had codified Roman law already in the 
thirteenth century and supplemented these rules periodically with imperial ordinances. However, Spain did 
not develop the legal principles that gave rise to the modern business corporation or an elaborate system of 
property rights based on the (political) recognition of the right to ownership. This also implies that Latin 
America, which received Spanish law in the 16th century, was exposed to Roman legal heritage, not, 
however, to the development of the private law, which formed the core of the formal legal orders that 
emerged in Europe in the nineteenth century. There is no definite time limit to distinguish a distant legal 
heritage from a more recently shared common legal history. From our discussion of law as a cognitive 
institution, it follows that the common history must still be recognizable in legal practice at the time when 
the foreign law is transplanted.  
  Imperialism and colonization resulted in a massive transplantation of Western law to other parts of 
the world. The majority of the people at the law-receiving end had no choice to adapt the law, sometimes not 
even to familiarize themselves with the law once it had been enacted. In some colonies, however, the 
transplantation of foreign law took quite a different form. The English empire distinguished between 
"settled" and "conquered" territories. Settled territories were considered to be barren land, the existence of 
indigenous people like the Indians in North America, the Aborigines in Australia, or the Maoris in New 
Zealand notwithstanding. But these territories were designated for migration from Europe and, in fact, 
experienced a massive influx of European people. The migrants used violence and their control of economic 
resources to seize power from the indigenous population. English law was transplanted to these territories 
through migration. The first settlers brought the law with them. In some cases, the applicability of English 
law remained in doubt or was disputed, and was only confirmed by the English crown. For our purposes, 
however, the important point is that in the case of the so-called settled territories, European law was not 
imposed on people accustomed to an entirely different legal order, but was applied to people who were 
familiar with its basic principles. Therefore, even a colonized country may be a receptive transplant if, 
because of the migration process, it exhibits familiarity with the formal legal order.  
Tables 2a and 2b provide a comparison of the origin and transplant categories with the legal 
families. As already noted, the legal families are excellent predictors of differences in creditor rights and 
shareholder rights. By contrast, Table 2b shows that the origin and transplant categories have almost no 
ability to explain these formal laws: in nineteen of the twenty-two possible binary comparisons, there is no  9
statistically significant difference. In the next sections, we will show that legal families by themselves cannot 
explain cross-country variance in legality, while the transplantation process is a more important determinant 
of legality, and its impact on economic development. 
  
3.      Legality and the Transplant Effect 
In this section we present tests of our hypothesis that the way in which the law is transplanted is a 
more important determinant of legality than the supply of a particular family. We also test for the impact of 
the process of transplantation and the supply of particular legal families on economic development (GNP per 
capita). If, after controlling for legality, there is a direct relationship between the transplanting process and 
economic development, then there is reason to believe that a well-designed legal reform would have an 
immediate positive impact on GNP per capita. If, however, the process of transplantation has a primarily 
indirect effect via its impact on legality, then an effective reform can improve legality, which, over time, will 
raise economic development. Similarly, it is critical to decompose the impact of supplying a particular legal 
family into its immediate direct effect and its indirect effect via its impact on legality. If legal families have a 
direct impact on GNP per capita, then policy makers could perhaps expect to obtain an immediate gain in 
GNP per capital by picking the best family.  
In order to measure legality, we first use the same survey data measuring the effectiveness of the 
judiciary, rule of law, the absence of corruption, low risk of contract repudiation and low risk of government 
expropriation observed during 1980-95 employed by LLSV (1997, 1998).
2 Log GNP per capita in 1994 
measures economic development. Appendix table 1 provides summary statistics for our data. The legality 
proxies are ranked on a scale from zero to ten, where a higher number means that legal institutions are more 
effective. The average correlation between a pair of the legality proxies is .801. This high correlation creates 
multicollinearity problems when log GNP per capita is regressed on the legality proxies. Therefore, 
following standard practice, we aggregate the individual legality proxies into a single legality index using 
principal components analysis.
3 The first component accounts for 84.6 percent of the total variance, and is 
given by Legality = .381*(Efficiency of Judiciary) + .578*(Rule of Law) +  
.503*(Absence of Corruption) + .347*(Risk of Expropriation) + .384*(Risk of Contract Repudiation). The 
analysis in this section is restricted to this single-variable legality measure. The validity of this simplification 
is formally investigated in the next section. 
   Since we do not have a structural model of the interactions between legality, economic 
development, and our exogenous variables (the transplantation process and the supply of particular legal 
families), our baseline model consists of two fully unrestricted reduced form equations for legality and 
economic development conditional on our exogenous variables. Let x  denote legality, and g the log of GNP 
per capita in 1994, and let i denote a country: i = 1…49. Let x denote a vector of regressors consisting of a 
constant term and the six exogenous other variables: receptive-transplant, unreceptive-transplant, French, 
                                                             
2 In the next section we also use a similar data for 1997-98 constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton (1999). 
3 Knack and Keefer (1994) construct an index of security of contractual and property rights with our legality 
proxies and other related variables. Because their data is highly correlated, they simply add it up to form 
their index. They note that their results are robust to other aggregation schemes, including principle 
components (factor analysis).  10
German, and Scandinavian families and OECD membership. We estimate the following unrestricted reduced 
form equations using ordinary least squares (OLS): 
(1)  u x + = ’ g x  
(2)  v x p g + = ’  
There are twenty-two OECD members in our sample. Legality in twenty of these OECD countries 
exceeds median legality in our sample; GNP per capita in twenty of the OECD countries also exceeds 
median GNP per capita. In order to account for the potential impact of OECD membership on x  and g, we 
control for it in our reduced form equations.
4 It follows from the definition of x that the intercepts represent 
averages for the English-origin countries. Therefore, the coefficient for a transplant variable captures the 
difference between an origin and a transplant; the coefficient for a family variable measures the difference 
between the English family and another family. It is useful to represent this system in the form of one 
unrestricted reduced form equation forx   given the exogenous variables (x) and one unrestricted regression 
equation for g, given x  and x: 
(3)  u x + = ’ g x  
(4)  e x + + = x c b g ’  
The systems (1)-(2) and (3)-(4) are equivalent to each other with 
(5)  g s s b c p b uu uv + = = , /  
where  uv uu and s s  denote the variance of u and the covariance between u and v, respectively, and the 
FRYDULDQFHV￿EHWZHHQ￿ ￿￿DQG￿￿x , x) are all zero by construction. Equation (5) decomposes the overall impact 
of our exogenous variables into a direct and indirect effect. For example, pj denotes total impact of regressor 
j on g; cj  GHQRWHV￿LWV￿GLUHFW￿HIIHFW￿DQG￿E j denotes its indirect effect via its impact on legality.  
The number of estimated regressors in the unrestricted system (equations 3-4) is large in 
comparison to the sample size of forty-nine countries. Unsurprisingly, therefore, unrestricted OLS estimates 
are not accurate, and have many statistically insignificant coefficients. We follow a standard reduction 
technique whereby insignificant coefficients (with a t-value less than 2) are sequentially eliminated one at a 
time (this corresponds to the ‘general to simple’ methodology advocated e.g. by Hendry (2000). Regression 
columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 report the restricted reduced form equation for legality, and the restricted 
regression equation for ln gnp per capita. Regression coefficients and standard errors in parentheses are 
reported in each cell.  
Regarding legality, the fit is quite impressive: we obtain an R
2 of 0.742. Three variables are 
excluded: the receptive-transplant, the German and the Scandinavian families. Unreceptive-transplant, 
French family and OECD dummies are all significant at the 1-percent level. In order to test globally these 
exclusion restrictions, we also compute an overall F test-statistic for the excluded variables and obtain a p-
value of 0.734, which fully validates our restricted equation. These exclusions have two implications: firstly, 
a receptive-transplant policy is effective, since its impact on legality is indistinguishable from the impact of 
being an origin; second, there is no substantial difference between the English, German and Scandinavian 
families.   11
The legality estimates contain several important implications about transplantation and legal 
families. The process of unreceptive-transplantation and the transplantation of French law both have a 
negative impact on legality, and the absolute impact of the unreceptive-transplant effect is marginally worse. 
Specifically, an unreceptive transplantation is associated with a 70-percent standard-deviation decline in 
legality; while transplanting the French family is associated with a 48-percent standard- deviation decline. 
Second, since the receptive-transplant, English, German and Scandinavian families variables are all set to 
zero, the unreceptive transplant variable measures the difference between a receptive and unreceptive 
transplant that has received either the English or German legal code.
5 The unreceptive-transplant plus the 
French family coefficients measures the difference between a receptive transplant that has received English 
or German law and an unreceptive transplant that has received the French code. Clearly, it is much worse to 
be an unreceptive transplant that has received the French law, than it is to be an unreceptive transplant that 
has received the German or English law. Third, the OECD dummy, in absolute terms, dominates either the 
impact of the French or unreceptive-transplant coefficient.  
An implication is that it is much worse to be an unreceptive-transplant that is not a member of the OECD, 
and the worst possible outcome is to be an unreceptive-transplant that has received the French code and is 
not a member of the OECD. Countries in this category include the Philippines, Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka 
and Colombia, and each is contained in the at the bottom quintile of our legality measures.
6  Finally, the 
families, by themselves, cannot adequately explain the cross-country variance in legality. In the test statistics 
section of table 5, we report the F test-statistic for the null hypothesis that only families enter the legal 
equation. This null is overwhelmingly rejected (the p-value is 0.000). 
Regarding the regression for economic development, the fit is also impressive: we obtain an R
2 of 
0.872, and, the test for the exclusion restriction passes with an impressive p-value of 0.985. This regression 
contains several important lessons about the impact of transplantation and legal families on economic 
development. First, since the unreceptive transplant coefficient is excluded from this regression, there is no 
direct unreceptive transplant effect and the negative impact of unreceptive transplantation on log GNP per 
capita is completely indirect. Multiplying the legality coefficient in this economic development regression 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
4 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for encouraging us to do this. 
5 There are no Scandinavian transplants. However, in our robustness table 5.2 we consider an alternative 
coding where Finland and Norway are coded as receptive-transplants.  
6 Only four of the twenty-eight unreceptive-transplants in our sample are members of the OECD by the 
beginning of 1994, and only three of the twenty-one origins and receptive transplants are nonmembers.  Our 
econometric specification assumes that the impact of OECD membership on legality is the same for 
unreceptive transplants and the group of receptive transplants and origins. If we relax this assumption, then 
our results are still robust, but OECD membership has a somewhat weaker impact on legality in the 
unreceptive transplants. One interpretation of this finding is that unreceptive transplantation had a strong 
negative impact on legality and economic development which made it difficult for countries to enter the 
OECD, and which subsequently limited development of good institutions in those unreceptive transplants 
that managed to enter. All in all, the most relevant comparison for evaluating the impact of transplantion is 
between a non-OECD unreceptive transplant and OECD members that are either receptive transplants or 
origins with, as shown in Table 5, an average difference of legality of 7.288 (3.017 + 4.271). As previously 
noted, GNP per capita in twenty of the twenty-two OECD members is higher than the sample median. Thus, 
a caveat with the OECD variable is that it may act as a high-income dummy variable. However, if this were 
the case, then the OECD variable should have a significant and positive impact on GNP per capita 
regression after controlling for legality. We show in the next paragraph that this is not the case. If we replace 
the OECD variable with a high-income-dummy variable in a GNP per capita regression controlling for 
legality, then the high-income dummy has a positive and significant impact. Clearly, the OECD variable 
plays a very different role than a high-income dummy in our model.  12
(.329) times the unreceptive-transplant coefficient in the restricted reduced form for legality (-3.017), the 
approximate indirect effect of transplant effect on log GNP per capita is – 1.00 (roughly two thirds of a 
standard deviation away from the mean log GNP per capita). Second, the impact of OECD membership on 
development is completely indirect, and is approximately equal to 1.41 (the legality coefficient in this 
economic development regression, .329, times the OECD coefficient in the legality regression, 4.271).  
Third, the overall impact of the French family is negligible. The indirect effect of the French family on log 
GNP per capita is .329 times –2.060, which is roughly -0.678. This completely offsets the direct 
French&German effect of .651. Finally, supplying the German family can have a substantial direct effect on 
GNP per capita that is not offset by any indirect effect. However, the absolute impact of the unreceptive 
transplantation (-1) dominates the overall impact of the German family (.658). Column five in table 5 
contains the system validated derived reduced form estimates and standard errors for the total impact of the 
transplantation and families on ln GNP per capita.
7 To see how this works, consider Colombia: it is an 
unreceptive transplant of French legal code, and GNP per capita in 1994 was $1,400 per capita. A receptive 
transplant strategy would have raised 1994 GNP per capita to roughly $3,785, which is comparable to 
Mexico and Uruguay. Transplanting the English or Scandinavian code in an unreceptive manner would have 
had no impact. Transplanting the German code in an unreceptive manner would have raised 1994 GNP per 
capita to only $2,690, which is comparable to Venezuela.  
These findings have important policy implications. An effective legal reform strategy should 
include measures that would avoid the transplant effect. Because the impact of the transplant effect on 
economic development is purely indirect, there is no reason to believe that a legal reform would have a 
direct and immediate impact on GNP per capita. Furthermore, because the transplant effect dominates the 
impact of legal families, the results do not support the idea that picking the correct family would lead to a 
direct and immediate gain in economic development. Finally, in the next section we will show that the 
relatively weak German is not robust to alternative legality measures. 
 
4.   Robustness 
To check for robustness of these results, we change Mexico from an unreceptive transplant to a 
half unreceptive and half receptive transplant; we also change Portugal and Spain from unreceptive to half 
unreceptive and half receptive. While Mexico copied the Spanish commercial code in an unreceptive fashion 
in 1854, twenty years later Mexico promulgated a civil code using various sources and including lessons 
from legal practice, and subsequently also revised the commercial code. While we usually use the date of the 
first reception, these two dates are very close. Moreover, it is questionable whether the earlier code had a 
long-term impact, because it was quickly superseded. Spain and Portugal are included in robustness test, 
because their proximity to France and Germany could suggest that they were fairly familiar with the modern 
formal legal order that developed in these countries, even though they themselves did not directly participate 
in this development. Table 5.1 shows that our original results (table 5) are robust to these modifications with 
only minor changes in the restricted legality reduced form equation (well within one standard deviation), and 
virtually no change in ln GNP per capita regression.  
                                                             
7Section 6 and a technical appendix describe the system test.  13
As another robustness check, we change several countries from origin to receptive-transplant. As 
previously noted, it can also be argued that Sweden transplanted the Scandinavian code to Finland, and that 
Denmark transplanted this code to Norway. Because there was familiarity between Sweden and Finland, and 
Denmark and Norway, we re-code Finland and Norway as receptive-transplants. The classification of the 
United States as origin is also controversial, because it can be argued that its process of developing the 
English common law was not significantly different than what was observed in other receptive-transplants of 
English law including Australia and Canada. Therefore, we change the United States from origin to 
receptive-transplant. While this change in code changes the unrestricted reduced form for legality and the 
regression for ln GNP per capita, it has no impact on the restricted results reported in Table 5. Though this 
may seem tautological in view of the fact that the restricted results in Table 5 excluded the receptive-
transplant dummy, it is important to emphasize that we reran the full simplification search as part of the 
robustness check. This re-codification marginally changes the various test statistics, which are reported in 
Table 5.2. Once again, a regression with families only has no explanatory power for legality, and the 
exclusion restrictions hold. 
We also check if our results are robust to an alternative legality measure including three proxies of 
legality developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999). Because these data are for 1997-98, we 
use ln GNP per capita in 1998 for the economic development regression and we extend OECD membership 
until 1998. Here again we use a principal components analysis. The first component, which accounts for 
95.9 percent of the total variance, is denoted legality (1997-98) and is given by .577*(Government 
Effectiveness) + .576*(Rule of Law) + .579*(Control of Corruption). Table 5.3 reports the estimates and 
test statistics. The fit is still impressive (R
2 = 0.612 for legality, R
2 = 0.783 for ln GNP per capita), but is 
lower than the original estimates. 
Regarding legality, the test statistics verify that the receptive-transplant and the German and 
Scandinavian families can be excluded, and the families, by themselves, still have poor explanatory power. 
The unreceptive-transplant and OECD dummy variables are both significant at the 1-percent level, while the 
significance of the French family deteriorates to the 7-percent level. In order to compare the impact of 
transplantation and families on original legality measure and legality (1997-98), it is useful to compare their 
impact on a standard deviation in legality. The unreceptive transplant is associated with a 70-percent and 87-
percent standard deviation decline in legality (1980-95) and legality (1997-98); the French family is 
associated with a 48-percent and 35-percent standard deviation decline in legality (1980-95) and legality 
(1997-98). Therefore, the absolute impact of an unreceptive transplant compared to a transplantation of the 
French family is stronger under the alternative legality measure. 
  Regarding economic development, the exclusion restriction test verifies that both transplant 
variables and all legal families can be excluded. Therefore, the result that the impact of the unreceptive-
transplant is completely indirect via its impact on legality is robust.  OECD membership, however, has a 
direct effect of .793, which almost one-half a standard deviation. However, there is a comparable indirect 
impact of OECD membership equal roughly  to .746 (the legality coefficient in this economic development 
regression, .607, times the OECD coefficient in the legality regression, 1.229). The results for legal families 
are not robust. In the original estimates, the French family had an insignificant impact on ln GNP per capita: 
its negative indirect impact through legality was offset by its positive direct effect. In the alternative  14
specification there is no direct effect of the French family that offsets the negative indirect effect. In the 
original estimates, the direct and overall impact of the German family on economic development were both 
positive. Column 5 in table 5.3 reports the overall impact and standard errors for the exogenous variables on 
economic development derived from the system test. The German effect vanishes in this alternative data set, 
while the French family has a negative overall impact. 
The substantial negative impact of an unreceptive transplant strategy, which in turn has a 
substantial indirect and overall impact on economic development, is robust to several modifications in code 
and to an alternative legality measure. The substantial (albeit weaker) impact of transplanting the French 
code on legality is also robust. However, just whether or not there is a negative or negligible impact of the 
French family on development, as well as a positive or negligible impact of the German family on 
development depends on how and when we measure legality. These robustness tests cast doubt on the idea 
that picking the correct legal family can provide an immediate and direct increase in output.  
 
5.   Validity of principal component aggregation 
Since we actually have observations on k legality proxies (five for 1980-95 and three for 1997-98), 
we must make sure that that in employing a single aggregate measure of legality we have not lost relevant 
information. In the absence of aggregation, our more general baseline model consists of k+1 fully 
unrestricted reduced form equations for y and g, conditionally on x: 
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where y denotes the vector of k legality proxies and g denotes ln GNP per capita. Here again, it is 
convenient to represent this system in the form of k reduced form equations for y given x and an unrestricted 
regression equation for g, given y and x  
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By equation (7.1) the unconditional covariance matrix of y is given by 
(9)  , ’ Õ F Õ + W = V                
ZKHUH￿ ￿GHQRWHV￿WKH￿FRYDULDQFH￿PDWUL[￿RI￿WKH￿[￿￿,Q￿WKLV￿GHFRPSRVLWLRQ￿RI￿9￿￿ Õ F Õ’  represents the 
explained variance of y, and W  represents the unexplained variance. 
  The validation of our earlier aggregate analysis requires the following three key assumptions:  
1.    The replacement of y by an aggregate measure  y ’ b x =  should not result in a loss of  
information with respect to the interactions between y and x. The relevant hypothesis is that the k 
rows of  ’ Õ  be proportional to another, i.e. that Õ  be of rank one:  
(10)  , ’ gb = Õ    15
where b g and are vectors and  b  is normalized to unity  ) 1 ’ ( = b b for identification. In the 
discussion that follows,  b  is estimated directly by constrained Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(hereafter MLE) of the reduced form (7.1). Note that the intercepts are not constrained to account 
for the fact that the k legal components are centered differently. 
2.  It follows from equation (10) thatb also represents the principal component of the explained 
covariance matrix  Õ F Õ’  with eigenroot g g F ’ . For it to coincide with the principal 
component of the unconditional covariance matrix V, we have to assume thatb  is also an 
eigenvector of the residual covariance matrix W .  Let d denote the corresponding eigenroot, in 
which case  g g d F + ’ is an eigenroot of V and, in fact, the leading eigenroot in view of the 
overall excellent fit of the reduced form. 
3.  Finally, we have to assume that only x , and not all k components of y, enter the ln GNP regression 
(7.2). This implies that b is proportional tob . 
 
These three assumptions imply a total of [6k – (k+5)] + 2(k-1) predominately nonlinear restrictions 
on Õ , V and b. This implies twenty-eight restrictions in the case of legality (1980-95) where k = 5, and 
fourteen restrictions in the case of legality (1997-98) where k = 3. The number of restrictions represents the 
degrees of freedom of the principal component likelihood ratio test statistics reported in the systems tests in 
tables 5, 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, together with the restricted MLE’s of  . , c and g b In view of the small sample 
size of forty-nine countries, all p-values and standard deviations are produced by Monte Carlo simulation 
(1,000 replications). The derivation of the MLE’s and likelihood ratio statistics is discussed in technical 
appendix that is available upon request. 
Tables 5, 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 show that the OLS estimates for the restricted reduced form legality 
equation and the restricted regression of economic development are fully validated by the system test. The 
estimated weights for the various legality components along with standard errors, which are reported on the 
bottom of tables 5 and 5.3 (the weights for table 5.1 and 5.2 are very close to those reported in table 5, and 
are available upon request), are very close to the weights assigned by principal components analysis. The 
point estimates for the OLS specification and system test are also very close. However, the system test’s 
standard errors are more efficient. The test-statistics show that all of the previous results obtained by OLS 
are completely robust. Given the pc (principal component) weighting, the likelihood ratio test shows that the 
families only regressions have poor explanatory power (the p-value is always 0.000) and the exclusion 
restrictions always hold (the lowest p-value is 0.858).  
Regarding aggregation, the principal components test statistic fully validates the principal 
components aggregation of the five legality proxies from LLSV et al (1998) data set into a legality (1980-
95) index: the p-values for this c
2(28) test of 0.139, 0.160, 0.113 all exceed the critical 0.10-level. However, 
aggregation from the Kaufmann et al (1999) data into legality (1997-98) is rejected: the p-value for this 
c
2(14) test statistic is 0.005. Two comments follow from this result. First, given this principal components 
weighting, the exclusion restrictions imposed on the restricted system still hold, and therefore, aggregation 
still is a useful simplification. Second, it is the impact of families on the legality proxies that drive this  16
rejection. If we examine the general system (7), then all of the results regarding the impact of transplantation 
and OECD membership are robust: the impact of the receptive transplant on the legality proxies and ln GNP 
per capita, given the legality proxies, is negligible; the unreceptive-transplant always has a negative impact 
on the legality proxies that, in absolute terms, dominates the impact of any particular family; the impact of 
the unreceptive transplant on ln GNP per capita is purely indirect via its impact on the legality proxies; and, 
OECD membership has a significant and positive effect on the reduced from regressions for the legality 
proxies and on ln GNP per capita after controlling for legality. The impact of the families is muddled: they 
have no significant impact on Government Effectiveness, and the French family has a negative impact on 
Control of Corruption and Rule of Law (these results are available upon request). Thus, the system test 
provides further evidence that impact of transplantation is robust, while the impact of the families on legality 
and economic development is relatively less robust.  
 
6. Conclusions 
We have shown that the way in which the law was initially transplanted is a more important 
determinant of legality than the supply of a particular legal family. Furthermore, the legal transplantation 
process has a large, albeit indirect, effect on economic development via its impact on legality. The policy 
implication of these results are fundamental: a legal reform strategy should aim at improving legality by 
carefully choosing legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by 
domestic law makers, law enforcers, and economic agents, who are the final consumers of these ruler. In 
short, legal reform must ensure that there is a domestic demand for the new law, and that supply can match 
demand. The close fit between the supply and demand for formal legal rules appears to be a crucial 
condition for improving the overall effectiveness of legal institutions, which over time will foster economic 
development. While further research is warranted before making practical policy recommendations, a 
cautious suggestion would be that legal borrowing should take place either from a country with a similar 
legal heritage, or substantial investments should be made in legal information and training prior to adoption 
of a law, so that domestic agents can enhance their familiarity with the imported law and make an informed 
decision about how to adapt the law to local conditions. This would at least increase the possibility that the 
new law will be used in practice. It is, however, vain to expect that an effective transplant strategy will have 
a direct or immediate impact on economic development.   17
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Origins  
Country  Legal formation period  Formal law source  Legal family 
Austria  1811-1862  Austria enacts a comprehensive civil code in 1811. It is 
an idiosyncratic codification based on the 
Roman/Germanic tradition. The 1862 general German 
commercial code reflects existing business practice as 
well as French influence. 
German  
 
Denmark  1815-1905  Early codification of customary law. Series of 
statutory enactments during the 19
th century. Legal 
borrowing is limited primarily to other Scandinavian 
countries. 
Scandinavian  
 
Finland
8  1809-1917  Strong influence of Swedish law before 1809 (Sweden 
cedes Finland to Russia). Finland remains attached to 
Scandinavian legal tradition throughout 19
th century 
and strengthens this after independence in 1917.  
Scandinavian  
 
France  1804-1811  Promulgation of the five Napoleonic Codes, including 
the Code civil, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Code 
of Commerce, the Code of Criminal Procedure, and 
the Penal Code. Codes consolidate legislation enacted 
prior to the revolution and codify business practice.  
French  
 
Germany  1862-1900  Extensive codification after unification in 1871. Most 
influential is the 1896 civil code based on Roman legal 
principles with some references to Germanic law. 
Earlier enactment of commercial code (1862) codifies 
existing business practice. 
German 
 
Norway
7  1814-1915  Until 1814 part of Denmark with gradual infiltration of 
Danish law. Statutory enactments during the 19
th 
century based draw on increasing legislative 
cooperation with Denmark and Sweden regarding.  
Scandinavian  
 
Sweden  1734-1905  Codification of customary law in 1734 (some Roman 
and canon law influences). In the 19
th century parts of 
the code are replaced with new statutes, many of 
which are based on collaborative efforts with Denmark 
and Sweden. 
Scandinavian  
 
Switzerland  1881-1907  Codification of commercial and civil law. In 
comparison to Germany less influence of Roman law. 
Codification of Swiss business practice, with some 
borrowing from French and Austrian laws that had 
earlier been enacted in parts of the country 
German  
 
United Kingdom  1485-1832  The development of English common law begins with 
the Norman conquest in 1066. Local customary law 
completely replaced since mid 15
th century. Increasing 
importance of statutory law since the 19
th century, but 
case law continues to dominate. 
English  
United States
1  1774-1820  In 1774, the first continental congress passes 
resolution that Americans are entitled to the common 
law and statutes that existed at the time of English 
colonization. Since late 18
th century courts overrule 
English law and assess it against American 
constitutional and utilitarian standards 
English  
                                                             
8 We thank an anonymous referee for noting that it is controversial just whether the countries should be 
categorized as origins or receptive-transplants. We conduct robustness tests for this alternative 
categorization.  19
Table 2a -Shareholder and Creditor Rights: 
Categorical Means for Legal Families
a 
 
Category Observations
a Shareholder  Rights  Creditor  Rights 
English 18/19  4.00 
(.970) 
3.11 
(1.231) 
French 21/19  2.33 
(1.197) 
1.58 
(1.346) 
German 6/6  2.33 
(1.033) 
2.33 
(.816) 
Scandinavian 4/4  3.00 
(.816) 
2.00 
(.816) 
Sample Average  49/47  3.00 
(1.307) 
2.30 
(1.366) 
 
Differences in Means
b 
 
English –  French 1.67 
(.000)* 
1.53 
(.001)* 
English – German  1.67 
(.008)* 
.78 
(.101)*** 
English – Scandinavian  1.00 
(.085)*** 
1.11 
(.065)*** 
French – German  0.00 
(1.000) 
-.75 
(.119) 
French – Scandinavian  -.67 
(.220) 
-.42 
(.438) 
German – Scandinavian  -.67 
(.291) 
.33 
(.548) 
 
Table 2b - Categorical Means for Origins and Transplants
a 
 
Category Observations
a  Shareholder Rights  Creditor Rights 
Origin 10/10  3.00 
(1.333) 
2.00 
(1.247) 
Transplant 39/37  3.00 
(1.318) 
2.38 
(1.401) 
Receptive Transplant 
  
11/11 3.27 
(1.618) 
1.91 
(0.944) 
Unreceptive Transplant 
  
28/26 2.89 
(1.197) 
2.58 
(1.528) 
Sample Average 
 
49/47/ 3.00 
(1.307) 
2.30 
(1.366) 
 
Differences in Means
b 
 
Origin – Transplant 
 
0.00 
(1.000) 
-0.38 
(.420) 
Origin – Receptive Transplant 
 
-0.27 
(0.677) 
-0.09 
(0.854) 
Origin – Unreceptive Transplant 
 
0.11 
(0.826) 
-0.58 
(0.258) 
Receptive – Unreceptive Transplant 
 
0.38 
(0.491) 
-0.67 
(0.117) 
 
aStandard deviations are in parentheses. 
bA two-sided two-sample t test with unequal variances is performed. 
P-values are reported in parentheses.  * Significant at the 1-percent level;  ** significant at the 5-percent 
level;*** significant at the 10 percent level.  20
 
 
Table 3: Receptive and Unreceptive Transplants 
 
Country Transplanting 
Period 
Transplantation Process  Transplant 
Type 
 
   Adaptation  Familiarity   
Australia 1808-1873  0  1  receptive 
Belgium 1810-1887  0  1  receptive 
Canada 1810-1830  0  1  receptive 
Ireland 1769-1801  0 1  receptive 
Israel 1858-1945  1  0  receptive 
Italy 1805-1870  1  1  receptive 
Japan 1868-1899  1  0  receptive 
Netherlands 1810-1838  1  1  receptive 
New Zealand  1840-1900  0  1  receptive 
Argentina 1862-1880 1  0  receptive 
Chile 1854-1880  1  0  receptive 
Brazil 1808-1865  0  0  unreceptive 
Colombia 1821-1853 0  0  unreceptive 
Ecuador 1831-1881  0  0  unreceptive 
Egypt 1798-1840  0  0  unreceptive 
Greece  1821-1878 0  0  unreceptive 
Hong Kong  1844-1898  0  0  unreceptive 
India 1858-1888  0  0  unreceptive 
Indonesia 1815-1870 0  0  unreceptive 
Jordan 1850-1918  0 0  unreceptive 
Kenya 1895-1918  0 0  unreceptive 
Malaysia 1867-1937  0  0  unreceptive 
Mexico 1821-1889  0  0  unreceptive 
Nigeria 1863-1915  0  0  unreceptive 
Pakistan 1858-1888  0  0  unreceptive 
Peru 1811-1853  0  0  unreceptive 
Philippines 1889-1898  0  0  unreceptive 
Portugal 1808-1867  0  0  unreceptive 
Singapore 1858-1895 0  0  unreceptive 
South Africa  1815-1865  0  0  unreceptive 
South Korea  1912-1945  0  0  unreceptive 
Spain 1808-1829  0  0  unreceptive 
Sri Lanka  1796-1861  0  0  unreceptive 
Taiwan 1895-1945  0  0  unreceptive 
Thailand 1908-1935  0  0  unreceptive 
Turkey 1850-1927  0 0  unreceptive 
Uruguay  1878-1900 0  0  unreceptive 
Venezuela 1811-1873 0  0  unreceptive 
Zimbabwe 1888-1923 0  0  unreceptive 
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Table 4: Transplants 
 
Country Transplanting 
period 
 Country/countries that transplant the Law  Legal family 
Receptive transplants 
Argentina  1862-1880  Spanish, Portuguese, Brazilian, Dutch (transplants) and 
French laws are important sources of law. Argentina asserts 
autonomy in 1810 and declares independence in 1816. 1862 
extensive legal reforms, including the enactment of civil, 
commercial, civil procedure laws. 
French 
Australia  1808-1873  English common law is the main source. Australia was 
considered a “settled colony”, where the settlers took the law 
of England with them. Major migration by free settlers from 
England in early 19
th century. 
English 
Belgium  1810-1887  French law is the main source. French law is introduced in 
1810 during Napoleonic wars. Independence of low countries 
in 1815, but codes remain in place. Independent Belgium 
(since 1830) enacts national codification based on French 
model.  
French 
Canada  1810-1830  English common law is the main source. Trading companies 
and settlers from England and the United States import 
English law. 
English 
Chile  1854-1880  Spanish (transplant), French law and legal practice are major 
sources. Independence from Spanish rule in 1811. Legal 
reforms in the second half of the 19
th century, including the 
enactment of a commercial code in 1854.  
French 
Ireland  1769-1801  English common law is the main source, and was introduced 
in Ireland after the Norman conquest. By the mid 17the 
century it had replaced the native Irish law.  
English 
Israel  1858-1945  English common law is the main source. Modern codes 
based on French model introduced in the Ottoman empire in 
second half of 19
th century. Since 1922 British mandate, 
migration from Europe. Ottoman law still binding, but basic 
principles of English common law (excluding statutory law) 
introduced.  
French/English
9 
Italy  1805-1870  French law is the main source. French rule since 1796; in 
1805 Napoleon becomes King of Italy and introduces French 
codes. National codification only after Italy is unified, but 
individual states enact codes based on French law. 
French 
Japan 
 
1868-1899  German law is the main source. Under foreign pressure, the 
Meji restoration launches the formalization of the Japanese 
legal system based on foreign models. Earlier drafts of the 
commercial code are based on French law. For the final 
versions of the civil and commercial law, German law is 
most influential.  
German 
Netherlands 
 
1810-1838  French law is the main source; its codes are introduced in 
1810 during when France annexes the Netherlands. After 
1815 the laws remain in force on a preliminary basis and are 
replaced in 1838 by Dutch codification based on French law. 
French 
New Zealand 
 
1840-1900  English common law is the main source. In 1840 Britain 
officially takes possession of the country. Legal transplant 
through migration. 
English 
                                                             
9 La Porta et al. (1998) code Israel as belonging to the English common law family.   22
 
Table 4: Transplants (continued) 
 
Unreceptive transplants 
Brazil  1808-1865  Spanish and French laws are the main sources. 1822 
Brazil achieves independence from Portugal. Imperial 
Portuguese law remains in force. Legal modernization 
occurs in mid 19
th century. 
French 
Colombia  1821-1853  Spanish law is the main source. Major codification 
enacted in mid 19
th century based on Spanish models of 
1829. Subsequent revisions based on Chilean law. 
French 
Ecuador  1831-1881  Spanish and Venezuelan laws are the main sources. 
Since 1830 independent state. In 1831, the Spanish 
code is made directly applicable in Ecuador. The 1882 
commercial code is based on the Venezuelan 
codification. Procedural law governed by Spanish law. 
French 
Egypt  1798-1840  French law is the main source. Under French 
occupation from 1796-1807 courts are established, but 
legal reform remains incomplete. During the 19
th 
century French law is applied to cases involving foreign 
parties. Textbooks and translations of French law into 
Arabic serve as primarily sources of this law.  
French 
Greece  1821-1878  French law is the main source. Translations of French 
codes in the 19
th century influences commercial law. 
Other statutory enactments during 19
th century, in 
particular the civil code, draw not only on French, but 
also heavily on German and Austrian law.  
French/German
10 
Hong Kong  1844-1898  English common law is the main source. Ordinance of 
1844 declares law of England applicable to colony 
except where local circumstances render this 
inappropriate.  
French 
India  1858-1888  English common law is the main source. Establishment 
of British Raj in 1858. Jurisdiction of English law over 
local population gradually expanded. In 1862 all 
existing courts in India are replaced with English courts. 
English 
Indonesia  1815-1870  Dutch law is the main source. Local (adat) law applies 
to indigenous population. Dutch law governs colonial 
population.  
French 
Jordan  1850-1918  French law is the main source. As part of the Ottoman 
empire, Jordan received French law in mid 19
th century.  
French 
Kenya  1895-1918  English common law is the main source. Since 1895 
British protectorate. The laws in force in England are 
made applicable in the colony, and codifications of 
common law that were earlier used in India are 
introduced. 
English 
Malaysia  1867-1937  English common law is the main source. In 1867, 
London‘s colonial office assumes direct control over 
“Straits Settlements”. English law applied primarily to 
criminal and commercial (not family, inheritance) 
matters. 
English 
 
                                                             
10 La Porta et a. (1998) code Greece as part of the French legal family. With regard to the civil (not the 
commercial) code, it could also be placed in the German legal family.   23
 
Table 4: Transplants (continued) 
Unreceptive Transplants 
Mexico
11  1821-1889  Spanish and French laws are the main sources. Spanish 
imperial laws remain in force until replaced by new 
codifications. 1854 commercial code based on Spanish 
and French models; 1889 revision also incorporates 
elements of Italian law. Civil procedure modeled on 
Spanish law. 1870 comprehensive civil code based on 
various models. 
French 
Nigeria  1863-1915  English common law is main source. Cession of Lagos in 
1863 and establishment of British rule. Courts with 
jurisdiction over British subjects established. Codified 
common law introduced, including 1912 companies 
ordinance. 
English 
Pakistan  1858-1888  English common law is the main source. Establishment of 
British Raj (including India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh). 
See comments for India. 
English 
Peru 1811–1853  Spanish law is the main source. Legal reforms in mid 19
th 
century copy Spanish codes of 1829. 
French 
Philippines  1889-1898  Spanish law is the main source. Spanish colony since 
1565. Codifications in the late 19 hundreds are based 
Spanish codes of 1829. Amendments and introduction of 
new procedural rules when sovereignty over the 
Philippines is transferred to the US in 1898, but character 
of legal system remains unchanged.  
French 
Portugal
10  1808-1867  French law is main source. First introduction of the 
French codes in 1808 during the Napoleonic invasion. 
New civil code promulgated in 1867, new Commercial 
Code in 1888.  
French 
Singapore  1858-1895  English common law is the main source. In 1819 
Singapore is founded as part of the Strait Settlements. 
English law applies to settlers and local population in 
criminal and commercial matters. 
English 
South Africa
11  1815 -1865  England and Roman-Dutch common law are the main 
sources. British takeover of former Dutch colony in 1815. 
English law applied to court organization, judicial 
procedure, and administration.  
English
12 
South Korea  1912-1945  Japanese law is the main source. Korea is colonized by 
Japan in 1912 and Japanese codes of the Meiji restoration 
are enacted.  
German 
Spain
10  1808-1829  French law is the main source. Introduction of the French 
codes in 1808 during the Napoleonic invasion. New civil 
code based on French model introduced in 1829; law on 
joint stock companies in 1848, and a revised code of civil 
procedure in 1881. 
French 
Sri Lanka  1796-1861  English common law is the main source. British take over 
former Dutch colony. Roman-Dutch law continues to 
apply, but the establishment of common law courts after 
1801 fosters the development of English common law. 
English 
Taiwan  1895-1945  Japanese law is the main source. The island of Taiwan 
becomes Japanese colony and Japanese codes of the Meiji 
restoration are introduced. 
German 
                                                             
11 We note in the paper that these three countries can also be categorized as a combination receptive- 
unreceptive transplant. We conduct robustness tests for this alternative categorization. 
12 Because of the influence of Roman-Dutch law, South Africa is sometimes classified as a mixed 
jurisdiction. In mixed jurisdictions, common law was introduced after earlier transplants had established a 
civil law system. Other mixed jurisdictions include Israel, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka.   24
 
Table 4: Transplants (continued) 
Unreceptive Transplants 
Thailand
12  1908-1935  French law is the main source. Only country in SE Asia 
that escaped colonization. Set of codes produced under 
King Chulalongkorn with the help of French and Belgian 
advisors. 
French (English ?)
13 
Turkey
13  1850-1927  French and subsequently Swiss law are the main sources. 
The Ottoman empire introduces legislation based on 
French law in mid 19
th century. Under Kemal Atatürk 
Turkey copies Swiss codes. 
French/German
14 
Uruguay  1878-1900  The law of Argentina is the main source. Modernization of 
legal system since 1865; codes are based on Argentine and 
Bolivian law models. 
French 
Venezuela  1811-1873  Chilean law is the main source. Venezuela becomes 
independent in 1811. Spanish imperial laws remain in 
force. In 1862 civil and commercial codes enacted based 
on Chilean model.  
French 
Zimbabwe  1888-1923  English common law is the main source. In 1888 charter 
issued by English law made applicable by decree.  
English 
 
                                                             
13 Note that La Porta et al. (1998) code Thailand as belonging to the English legal family. 
14 LLSV 1998 code Turkey as French, because of the Ottoman heritage.  25
 
Table 5: Determinants of Legality (1980-95) and Economic Development (1994) 
 
  Ordinary Least Squares 
Specification 
System Test 
 Legality 
 
Ln GNP per 
capita  
Legality  
 
Ln GNP 
per capita 
 
GNP: 
derived 
reduced 
form 
Unreceptive – 
Transplant  
-3.017* 
(0.958) 
 -3.020* 
(0.941) 
 -0.995* 
(0.315) 
French 
 
-2.060* 
(0.679) 
 -2.063* 
(0.665) 
 -0.680* 
(0.222) 
French& 
German 
 0.651* 
(0.160) 
 0.653* 
(0.155) 
0.653* 
(0.155) 
OECD 
Member 
4.271* 
(0.929) 
 4.267* 
(0.882) 
 1.406* 
(0.304) 
Legality  
  
 0.329* 
(0.019) 
 0.330* 
(0.019) 
 
Intercept 16.731* 
(0.943) 
2.926* 
(0.336) 
16.74* 
(0.923) 
2.924* 
(0.347) 
8.440* 
(0.321) 
R
2 0.742  0.872    0.742  0.873  0.638 
Test statistics Given  pc  Given  pc 
 
 
Families only 
 
P-value 
F(2.45) 
= 51.75 
0.000 
Not relevant 
2(6) = 52.39 
0.000 
Exclusion restrictions: 
 
P-value 
F(3,42) 
= 0.43 
0.734 
F(5,41)  
= 0.24 
0.942 
2(8)  
= 2.88 
0.965 
 
Not 
relevant 
Principal components test: 
P-value 
Not relevant 
2(28) = 43.11 
0.139 
Not 
relevant 
 
 
 
Weighting 
method 
Weights on Legality (1980-95) Components  Share of 
Variance 
 Efficiency 
of Judiciary 
Rule of 
Law 
Corruption  Risk of 
Expropriation 
Risk of 
Contract 
Repudiation 
 
Principal 
Component 
0.381 0.578  0.503 0.347  0.384  84.6% 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
0.370* 
(0.044) 
0.578* 
(0.029) 
0.505* 
(0.025) 
0.350* 
(0.019) 
0.389* 
(0.019) 
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Table 5.1: Robustness check for receptive-unreceptive transplant coding 
 
  OLS Specification  System Test 
 Legality 
 
Ln GNP per 
capita  
Legality  
 
Ln GNP 
per capita 
 
g:derived 
reduced 
form 
Unreceptive – 
Transplant  
-3.465* 
(1.022) 
 -3.465* 
(0.998) 
 -1.142* 
(0.335) 
French 
 
-2.247* 
(0.657) 
 -2.249* 
(0.641) 
 -0.741* 
(0.214) 
French& 
German 
 0.651* 
(0.160) 
 0.652* 
(0.155) 
0.652* 
(0.155) 
OECD 
Member 
3.839* 
(0.982) 
 3.838* 
(0.925) 
 1.265* 
(0.314) 
Legality  
  
 0.329* 
(0.019) 
 0.330* 
(0.019) 
 
Intercept 17.155* 
(0.998) 
2.926* 
(0.336) 
17.16* 
(0.973) 
2.925* 
(0.347) 
8.579* 
(0.336) 
R
2  0.749  0.872    0.749  0.873  0.645 
Test statistics Given  pc  Given  pc  Including 
pc 
Families only 
 
P-value 
F(2,45) = 
53.88 
0.000 
Not relevant 
2(6) = 54.68 
0.000 
Exclusion restrictions: 
 
P-value 
F(3,42) = 
0.45 
0.716 
F(5,41)  
= 0.38 
0.859 
2(8)  
= 3.79 
0.918 
 
Not 
relevant 
Principal components 
test: 
P-value 
Not relevant 
2(28) = 42.13 
0.160 
Not 
relevant 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Robustness check for origin-transplant coding 
 
Test statistics Given  pc  Given  pc   
Families only 
 
P-value 
F(2,45) = 
51.75 
0.000 
Not relevant 
2(6)  
= 52.53  
0.000 
Exclusion restrictions: 
 
P-value 
F(3,42) = 
0.44 
0.729 
F(5,41)  
= 0.26 
0.932 
2(8)  
= 3.03 
0.965 
 
Not 
relevant 
Principal components 
test: 
P-value 
Not relevant 
2(28) = 44.87 
0.113 
Not 
relevant 
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Table 5.3: Robustness check for alternative legality measure 
 
  OLS Specification  System Test 
 Legality 
 
Ln GNP per 
capita  
Legality  
 
Ln GNP 
per capita 
 
g:derived 
reduced 
form 
Unreceptive – 
Transplant  
-1.482* 
(0.420) 
 -1.421* 
(0.387) 
 -0.900* 
(0.274) 
French 
 
-0.601** 
(0.326) 
 -0.581** 
(0.302) 
 -0.368** 
(0.199) 
OECD 
Member 
1.229* 
(0.405) 
0.793* 
(0.273) 
1.178* 
(0.376) 
0.793* 
(0.269) 
1.539* 
(0.323) 
Legality  
  
 0.607* 
(0.081) 
 0.633* 
(0.086) 
 
Intercept 0.503 
(0.426) 
8.341* 
(0.168) 
1.611* 
(0.400) 
7.628* 
(0.141) 
8.648* 
(0.317) 
R
2 0.612  0.783  0.638  0.789  0.601 
Test statistics Given  pc  Given  pc 
 
 
Families only 
 
P-value 
F(2,45) = 
29.36 
0.000 
Not relevant 
 
2(6) =  
40.05 
0.000 
Exclusion restrictions: 
 
P-value 
F(3, 42) =    
0.19 
0.900 
F(5,41) = 
0.67 
0.645 
2(8) =  
4.69 
0.858 
 
 
Not 
relevant 
Principal components 
test: 
P-value 
 
Not relevant 
 2(14) = 36.64 
0.005 
Not 
relevant 
 
 
 
Weighting 
method 
Weights on Legality (1997-98) Components  Share of 
variance 
 Government 
Effectiveness 
Rule of Law  Control of 
Corruption 
 
Principal 
Component  
0.577 0.576 0.579  95.9% 
Maximum 
Likelihood 
0.565* 
(0.018) 
0.567* 
(0.019) 
0.599* 
(0.017) 
 
 
Notes: The origin and English dummy variables are normalized at zero. OECD membership  
until the beginning of 1994 is used for legality (1980-95), and through 1998 for legality    
(1997-98).     
 Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
*Significant at the 1– percent level; **Significant at the 5-percent level. A standard deviation in 
legality (1980-95) is 4.32; a standard deviation in legality (1997-98) is 1.696. 
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Appendix I 
 
Appendix Table 1: Legality (1980-95) and Economic Development (1994) 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Efficiency of 
Judiciary System 
1980-83 
 
Rule of 
Law 
1982-95 
 
Absence of 
Corruption 
1982-95 
 
Risk of 
Expropriation 
1982-95 
Risk of 
Contract 
Repudiation 
1982-95 
 
 
 
Legality 
1980-95 
GNP 
Per Capita 
(U.S. $) 
1994 
Average 7.67  6.74  6.90  8.05  7.58  16.05  11156 
Median 7.25  6.78  7.27  8.25  7.57  16.54  7660 
Standard Deviation  2.05  2.80  2.29  1.59  1.79  4.32  10190 
Minimum 2.50  0.00  2.15  5.22  4.36  8.51  270 
Maximum 10.00  10.00  10.00  9.98  9.98  21.91  35760 
 Correlation  Coefficients 
Efficiency of 
Judiciary 
1.000          
Rule of Law  0.643  1.000           
Corruption 0.793  0.848  1.000         
Risk of 
Expropriation 
0.656 0.910  0.845 1.000       
Contract Repudiation  0.635  0.880  0.841  0.961  1.000     
Legality 0.803  0.950  0.949  0.944  0.930  1.000   
GNP Per Capita  0.738  0.853  0.839  0.871  0.871  0.906  1.000 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2: Legality (1997-98) and Economic Development (1998) 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
1997-98 
 
Rule of 
Law 
1997-98 
 
Control of 
Corruption 
1997-98 
 
 
Legality 
1997-98 
GNP 
Per Capita 
(U.S. $) 
1998 
Average 0.645  0.644  0.663  0.000  13107 
Median 0.714  0.861  0.672  0.245  10670 
Standard Deviation  0.940  0.944  0.989  1.696  11837 
Minimum -1.321  -1.220  -0.954  -3.216  300 
Maximum 2.082  1.996  2.129  2.473  39980 
Correlation Coefficients 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
1.000 
    
Rule of Law  0.923  1.000       
Control of 
Corruption 
0.944 0.934  1.000    
Legality 0.979  0.977  0.982  1.000   
GNP per capita  0.817  0.838  0.842  0.850  1.000 
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Technical Appendix: Constrained Estimation of the Reduced Form Model 
 
ML estimation of the system (7) under the hypotheses introduced in section 6 proceeds stepwise. Firstly, 
conditionally on any given value of b , we transform the system into one which can be estimated by 
Ordinary Least Squares (hereafter OLS). The corresponding (analytical) concentrated log likelihood 
function is then numerically maximized w.r.t.  . b  In this appendix, we outline the first stage derivations, 
which are conditional on any given value of  , b  as selected by the second stage numerical optimizer.  The 
critical step consists of a linear transformation of the legal reduced form (7.1) into  
 
(A.1)     ), , 0 ( ~ , V N v v x P y k + ¢ = A = f  
 
where  . A A V and A P ¢ W = ¢ P =  A is a square non-singular matrix such that  , e A k = b  where  k e  
denotes the last column of the identity matrix  . Ik  Let partition b¢  into  ), ( 2 1 b b¢ = b¢  where  0 2 ¹ b  is a 
scalar. A convenient choice for A is given by  
 
(A.2)     .
1 0 0
0 I
A
1 1 k b¢ × ÷ ÷
ø
ö
ç ç
è
æ b -
+ ÷ ÷
ø
ö
ç ç
è
æ
=
-  
 
All vectors and matrices in (A.1) are then partitioned conformably with b  into  
 
() . , ,
22 21
12 11
2 1
2
1
2
1
÷ ÷
ø
ö
ç ç
è
æ
= = ÷ ÷
ø
ö
ç ç
è
æ
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ø
ö
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è
æ
=
v v
v V
V and p P P
v
v
v
f
f
f  
 
It is then trivial to verify that assumptions  b¢ g = P : H1  and  lb b = W : 2 H  are transformed into 
assumptions  0 : 1
*
1 = P H  and  , 0 : 12
*
2 = v H  respectively. A further simplification obtains if we factorize 
the density of  , x | f  as given in (A.1) into those of  x | 1 f  and  . x , | 1 2 f f  Under 
*
1 H  we have  
 
(A.3)     ), , 0 ( ~ | 11 1 1 V N x k- f  
 
(A.4)     ) v , x ( N ~ x , |
2
1 1 1 2 f d¢ + g¢ f f  
 
where  12
1
11 v V
- = d  and  . v V v v v 12
1
11 21 22
2 - - =  The coefficients () 11
2 V , v , , d g  are then estimated by 
OLS (ML) and the corresponding constrained ML estimates of  ) , ( W P  are obtained by inversion of the 
transformation introduced above. The same analysis applied under  , H H
*
2
*
1 È  with the additional 
simplification that  . 0 = d  The GNP regression in (7.2) is also estimated by OLS (ML). Its restricted 
version (when b is proportional to b ) takes the form of a regression of g on x and  . y b¢  
 
Finally, the concentrated log likelihood function takes the form  
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where  () b s
2 ~  and  () b W
~
 denote the first stage ML (OLS) estimators of 
2 s  and W , respectively (with no 
degrees of freedom correction). 
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